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 A DELICATE BALANCE OF  
LIFE TENURE AND INDEPENDENCE: 
CONDITIONAL RESIGNATIONS FROM  
THE FEDERAL BENCH 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
[T]he judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three 
departments of power; . . . it can never attack with success 
either of the other two; and . . . all possible care is requisite to 
enable it to defend itself against their attacks. 
Alexander Hamilton
1
 
 
In a letter dated October 4, 2007, Judge John C. Shabaz of the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin submitted a letter 
of resignation
2
 to President George W. Bush.
3
  The letter states: 
 
Please be advised that under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.  
§ 371(b)(1) I shall assume senior status effective when your 
nominee appointee, my successor, is confirmed by the United 
States Senate and on the date of your subsequent appointment 
on or before January 20, 2009.  Pending the confirmation 
process for my successor, I will remain on active status so 
that the Western District of Wisconsin remains current in the 
administration of its caseload.
4
 
 
Similarly, Chief Judge Rudolph T. Randa, from the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, submitted a resignation subject to 
his successor being appointed before the expiration of President George W. 
 
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 472–73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic reissue 2003). 
2. For the purposes of this Comment, a ―resignation‖ from a federal judgeship is a notification 
that the judge plans to either elect full retirement or assume senior status. 
3. Posting of Letter from Judge John C. Shabaz, Judge for the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Wisconsin, to President George W. Bush (Oct. 4, 2007), 
http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/071010ShabazLetter.pdf [hereinafter Shabaz].  Nominated by 
President Ronald Reagan in 1981, Shabaz served as a judge for the Western District of Wisconsin for 
twenty-seven years.  Federal Judicial Center, Judges for the United States Courts, Shabaz, John C., 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (click ―S,‖ then click ―Shabaz, John C.‖).  Judge Shabaz 
served as Chief Judge from 1996 to 2001, and he assumed senior status on January 20, 2009.  Id. 
4. Shabaz, supra note 3. 
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Bush‘s term.5 
Judicial selection, including judicial resignations, nominations, and 
confirmations, is comprised of a patchwork of traditions, rules, and 
constitutional provisions.
6
  The Constitution does not explicitly detail a 
formalized process at any stage of the appointments process, but checks and 
balances have organically developed and changed over time as the process has 
become more politicized.  The question becomes, then, whether conditional 
resignations comport with this system or the Framers‘ intent.  At the Supreme 
Court level, conditional resignations are rare.
7
  Only a handful of conditional 
resignations have ever been submitted.
8
  At the court of appeals and district 
court levels, it is unclear how widespread this practice is.
9
  Neither Congress 
 
5. John Diedrich, Federal Judge Randa to Move into Semi-Retirement, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, June 15, 2007, at 3B; Posting of Press Release Regarding Judge Rudolph T. Randa, Judge 
for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin to President George W. 
Bush (June 13, 2007), http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/070613Randa.pdf.  Nominated by President 
George H.W. Bush and appointed in 1992, Judge Randa continues to serve in the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin.  Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, Randa, Rudolph Thomas, 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (click ―R,‖ then click ―Randa, Rudolph Thomas‖).  Judge 
Randa served as Chief Judge from 2002 through August 2009.  Id.; John Diedrich, U.S. Judge Not 
Taking New Criminal Cases: His Actions After Dispute May Cause Bottleneck, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 2009, at 1A.  Nominated by President George W. Bush to fill the future 
vacancies of Judge Shabaz and Judge Randa, respectively, Waukesha County District Court Chief 
Judge J. Mac Davis and Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Timothy G. Dugan never received 
Senate confirmation and continue to serve on their respective benches.  Jack Zemlicka, Group to 
Review Shabaz, Biskupic Replacements, WIS. L.J., Feb. 9, 2009, at 1.  Indeed, on January 12, 2009, 
then-Chief Judge Randa submitted a letter to President George W. Bush, saying: 
 
In June of 2007, I decided to assume senior status upon confirmation of your 
appointee to this position.  This has not occurred, and I have decided to remain 
on active status and carry out the full duties and obligations of the office. 
Letter from Chief Judge Rudolph T. Randa, United States District Court, Eastern District of 
Wisconsin, to President George W. Bush (Jan. 12, 2009) (on file with the MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL). 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. Matthew Madden, Note, Anticipated Judicial Vacancies and the Power to Nominate, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 1135, 1136 (2007). 
8. Id. 
9. See James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 573 (1995) (finding that ―judges are 
[more] likely to retire when political conditions favor the selection of successors sharing their policy 
views or when unfavorable political conditions appear unlikely to change‖); Gary Zuk, Gerard S. 
Gryski & Deborah J. Barrow, Partisan Transformation of the Federal Judiciary: 1869–1992, 21 AM. 
POL. RES. 439, 439 (1993) (finding that judges engage in politically motivated departures); Deborah 
J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of Turnover in the Lower Federal Courts:  
1900–1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 457 (1990) (finding that ―presidential elections, salary increases, 
improved retirement benefits, caseload, and major Supreme Court decisions‖ influence judicial 
departures from the lower federal courts).  But see David C. Nixon & J. David Haskin, Judicial 
Retirement Strategies: The Judge’s Role in Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 
AM. POL. RES. 458, 458 (2000) (concluding that judicial retirements are primarily based on 
―nonpolitical considerations,‖ however, ―presidential elections may factor into a judge‘s decision‖).  
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nor the President has prohibited conditional resignations.
10
  Indeed, 
resignations subject to a date certain have generally been accepted.
11
 
This Comment explores the constitutionality of conditional resignations 
within the context of judicial selection.  Part II will detail the appointments 
process, including judicial resignations, nominations, and confirmations.  This 
Part also includes a discussion of the politicization of judicial selection for the 
federal bench.  Part III explores the constitutional limits of conditional 
resignations.  This Part discusses whether conditional resignations comport 
with the Framers‘ concept of a permanent and independent judiciary.  While 
avoiding constitutional and institutional problems thus far, conditional 
resignations threaten to upset the delicate balance of tension between the 
Judiciary, Executive, and Legislative branches in the appointments process.  
Part IV culminates with a discussion of the next natural step for judicial 
selection—that is, regulation.  If the judiciary tips the delicate balance by 
submitting problematic conditional resignations, attempts to regulate judicial 
departures may naturally follow.  For example, Congress could enact 
sweeping legislation that regulates judicial departures.  By exercising its 
power through the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may attempt to 
statutorily define ―good Behaviour‖ to prohibit or place restrictions on 
conditional resignations.  Moreover, actions could be brought challenging the 
validity of conditional resignations under current ethics procedures or in 
federal court.  Finally, Part V concludes that conditional resignations protect 
judicial permanency in office by providing another check and balance in the 
patchwork of traditions, rules, and constitutional requirements in the 
appointments process.  As an extension of these changes, the conditional 
resignation can be interpreted as judges asserting more control over their life 
tenure and independence. 
II.  JUDICIAL SELECTION: A PATCHWORK QUILT OF TRADITIONS, RULES, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution creates the federal judiciary, providing 
that: ―The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
 
―The only important strategic political consideration‖ is the president‘s party affiliation and ―how far 
off that president‘s next election is.‖  Id. 
10. See USCourts.gov, Future Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary: 111th Congress, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/reports/jdarvac1_future_circuit.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2009) 
(listing future vacancies and illustrating that many vacancies are not effective upon the date the 
resignation letter was submitted; that is, many are conditioned upon a future date and have been 
accepted as creating a vacancy). 
11. See id. 
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ordain and establish.‖12  The federal court system, first established by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, has grown from ―a six-member Supreme Court, 
thirteen district courts, and three circuit courts‖ judiciary13 to a body of 876 
authorized judgeships.
14
  There are 9 Supreme Court justices, 179 Courts of 
Appeals judges, 679 District Court judges, and 9 Court of International Trade 
judges authorized by Article III.
15
 
The Constitution vests the power to fill the judgeships in the Executive 
and Legislative branches of the government,
16
 and the Executive and 
Legislative branches have responded with their own formal and informal 
procedures for filling judgeships.
17
  Equally important are the means of 
judicial departures, including retirement.  Congress statutorily regulates 
retirement options,
18
 but does not regulate the timing or form of such 
departures.  Over time, each branch of government has asserted more power 
in the judicial retirement and selection processes by maximizing the use of the 
tools available to it.
19
  The Executive has institutionalized an ideologically 
 
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
13. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 11 (2005). 
14. USCourts.gov, Summary of Judicial Vacancies, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialvac.cfm 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2009). 
15. Id.  These figures do not include magistrate, bankruptcy, or other statutorily authorized 
judgeships. 
16. See generally U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges 
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of 
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts 
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
Id. 
17. See id.; 155 CONG. REC. S2550–51 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2009) (―Committee on the Judiciary, 
Rules of Procedure‖), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/about/committee-rules.cfm; E. Stewart 
Moritz, “Statistical Judo”: The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in the Judicial Appointment Process, 22 
J.L. & POL. 341, 352 (2006). 
18. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 371–377 (2006). 
19. See generally Charles W. Pickering, Sr. & Bradley S. Clanton, A Proposal: Codification by 
Statute of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 807, 811 (2006).  
Judicial nominations are ―‗one of the principal ideological battlegrounds of American politics.‘‖  Id. 
(quoting G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND/CENTURY FOUND., STARTING OVER: 
THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS IN 1997, at 20 (1998)).  See generally Charles G. Geyh, 
Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in 
Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 218–19 (2003) (discussing the 
politicization in the appointments process for federal judges). 
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based selection process, and the Senate has more frequently employed delay 
tactics, resulting in a longer confirmation process and fewer appointments.
20
  
Judicial nominations and confirmations have, without question, become more 
politicized.
21
  In addition to the means used by the Executive and Legislative 
branches to assert their power, each branch of government has developed 
safeguards to protect its institutional power in the decision-making process.  
Conditional resignations from the federal bench are another natural result of 
this tension. 
A.  Voluntary Departures: Judicial Retirement 
Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides: 
 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.  The 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated 
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
22
 
 
The federal judge, through the life tenure and good behavior provisions, is 
the ―master of his tenure.‖23  He can depart at his will, and historically, 
departures from the bench occurred when a judge passed away while in office 
or when a judge was criminally convicted.
24
  Departures from the federal 
judiciary now take several forms, including retirement, elevation, death, 
resignation, and impeachment.
25
  The life tenure and good behavior provisions 
are the constitutional foundation for creating vacancies in the federal 
judiciary.
26
 
Voluntary departures from the bench are currently the primary source of 
vacancies.
27
  The motivations behind these departures are typically personal.  
These reasons include: ―age, health, family concerns, workload, and 
 
20. Pickering & Clanton, supra note 19, at 811; Geyh, supra note 18, at 218–19. 
21. Pickering & Clanton, supra note 19, at 811; Geyh, supra note 18, at 218–19. 
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
23. Madden, supra note 7, at 1155; see also David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life 
Tenure: The Case for A “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005) (discussing life tenure 
and the argument that life tenure should be retained). 
24. Madden, supra note 7, at 1155. 
25. Id. at 1154–55. 
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
27. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 13, at 33. 
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economics.‖28  Politics, though, can also be a motivation.29  Judges sometimes 
engage in strategic departures, choosing to depart at a time when the judge has 
the same ideology or is of the same political party as the President, Senate, or 
both.
30
  Moving up the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, the evidence that 
political motivations underlie the timing of judicial departures is more 
certain.
31
 
Congress regulates judicial retirement options through a variety of 
statutes, the first of which Congress created through the Judiciary Act of 
1869.
32
  The Judiciary Act of 1869 permitted a judge to resign from office and 
receive a salary for the rest of his life, as long as he had served as an Article 
III judge for ―at least ten years and reached seventy years of age.‖33 
In 1937, Congress passed the Retirement Act, creating the ―senior status‖ 
option for Supreme Court Justices who met the Judiciary Act of 1869 
qualifications.
34
  Senior status allowed the Justice to ―retire,‖ instead of 
―resign,‖ and to maintain ―Article III power and status.‖35  The Retirement 
Act of 1954 is also significant because it allows judges who are sixty-five 
years of age and who have served for fifteen years to elect a retirement 
option.
36
  Finally, Congress created the ―Rule of Eighty‖ in 1984.37  This rule 
allows a judge to elect a retirement option when he is any age between sixty-
five and seventy years old, and when his age combined with any amount of 
 
28. Id. at 33–34. 
29. Id. at 36–40.  But see Terri Peretti & Alan Rozzi, Modern Departures from the U.S. 
Supreme Court: Party, Pensions, or Power?, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307845.  Peretti 
and Rozzi assert that empirical evidence does not support the conclusion that strategic departures are 
motivated by politics and that strategic departures from the Supreme Court, in fact, impose 
significant costs on those who choose to do so; that is, the Justice loses institutional ―position and 
influence.‖  Id. at 1. 
30. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 13, at 37–40.  Epstein and Segal note that there is conflicting 
authority over whether political motivations underlie judicial departures, specifically citing Professor 
Albert Yoon for this argument as applied to the trial courts.  Id. at 37.  At the appellate court level, 
however, political scientists have established that judges strategically time departures from the 
appellate courts for political reasons.  Id.  Furthermore, political motivations are unequivocally a 
reason for strategic timing of departures from the Supreme Court.  Id. at 38. 
31. Id. at 36–40. 
32. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44; Madden, supra note 7, at 1156.  Before 1869, the 
only voluntary departures occurred through resignation.  Madden, supra note 7, at 1155.  Congress 
has the power to regulate judicial retirement because the Necessary and Proper Clause vests the 
legislature with the power to regulate offices of which it has the authority to create.  See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  In this case, the offices are Article III judgeships. 
33. Madden, supra note 7, at 1156; Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45. 
34. Madden, supra note 7, at 1156; Retirement Act of 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24. 
35. Madden, supra note 7, at 1156–57. 
36. Retirement Act of 1954, Publ. L. No. 83-294, § 4, 68 Stat. 8, 12; Madden, supra note 7, at 
1157. 
37. Madden, supra note 7, at 1157. 
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years of service totals eighty years.
38
 
Judicial retirement is governed by various statutes in Title 28 of the 
United States Code, primarily in Chapter 17.
39
  28 U.S.C. § 371 is the most 
important statute, as it sets out the options of retirement with salary and senior 
status.
40
  Retiring with a salary under 28 U.S.C. § 371(a) means that the judge 
can retire from office and earn an ―annuity equal to the salary he was 
receiving at the time he retired.‖41  Under 28 U.S.C. § 371(b), a judge eligible 
for senior status under the age and service requirements of the Rule of Eighty 
may ―retain the office but retire from regular active service.‖42  This means 
that the judge receives the salary of an active judge and any increases in pay.  
Each year, a senior status judge must be certified by the ―chief judge of the 
circuit in which the judge sits.‖43 
Certification under § 371(b) requires fulfilling one of the following 
options within the calendar year.  The first option is for a judge to carry ―a 
caseload involving courtroom participation which is equal to or greater than 
the amount of work involving courtroom participation which an average judge 
in active service would perform in three months.‖44  Second, the judge can 
perform: 
 
[S]ubstantial judicial duties not involving courtroom 
participation . . . including settlement efforts, motion 
decisions, writing opinions in cases that have not been orally 
argued, and administrative duties for the court to which the 
justice or judge is assigned. . . . equal to or greater than the 
work described [herein] which an average judge in active 
service would perform in three months.
45
 
 
Third, the judge can perform a combination of work under the first two 
options that, ―in the aggregate equals at least 3 months work.‖46  The fourth 
option is that the judge can perform ―substantial administrative duties directly 
related to the operation of the courts, or has performed substantial duties for a 
 
38. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2006).  For example, a judge who is sixty-six years old and has 
fourteen years of service on the federal bench would qualify for senior status.  See 28 U.S.C.  
§ 371(c). 
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 371–377. 
40. Id. § 371. 
41. Id. § 371(a). 
42. See id. § 371(b)(1). 
43. Id. § 371(e)(1). 
44. Id. § 371(e)(1)(A). 
45. Id. § 371(e)(1)(B). 
46. Id. § 371(e)(1)(C). 
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Federal or State governmental entity.‖47 
B.  The Appointments Clause 
Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution vests the power of 
nominating and confirming federal judges with the Executive and Legislative 
branches, providing that ―[the President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States.‖48  While the delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia engaged in a short and 
agreeable debate over the tenure of federal judges, it took more than three 
months, ―virtually the duration of the entire convention,‖ for the delegates to 
the Convention to reach an agreement on how to select federal judges.
49
  
Among the proposals were those vesting the appointment power solely with 
the Executive or the Senate.
50
  Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, in its final, 
enacted text, represents what has been called a ―considerable compromise.‖51  
Commentators have suggested that the intense, diverse, and controversial 
debate over the rules governing judicial appointments stems from the belief 
that ―how we choose our judges plays a part in determining which types of 
men and women will serve as judges and, in turn, the choices that they will 
make in their post.‖52  Commentators diverge as to the proper balance 
between two central concepts in the judiciary—independence and 
accountability.
53
 
The constitutional framework and distinct functions of each branch are the 
foundations for the appointments process.
54
  The Supreme Court detailed the 
structure for the appointments process in Marbury v. Madison, when it held 
that the Constitution contemplates that the President has the ―‗sole‘‖ and 
―‗voluntary‘‖ power to nominate and the Senate has the power of appointment 
through its ―‗advice and consent.‘‖55 
 
47. Id. § 371(e)(1)(D); see David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges 
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007) (arguing that senior status, as provided in 28 
U.S.C. § 371, is unconstitutional and proposing ways to restructure the statute to comport with the 
Constitution).  But see Betty Binns Fletcher, A Response to Stras & Scott’s Are Senior Judges 
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (2007) (responding to the argument that senior status is 
unconstitutional and providing policy reasons to justify senior status). 
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  All federal judges are officers of the United States.  USCourts.gov, 
Federal Judges, http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2009). 
49. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 13, at 8. 
50. Madden, supra note 7, at 1140. 
51. Id. at 1141. 
52. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 13, at 8. 
53. Id. 
54. Madden, supra note 7, at 1143. 
55. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803)). 
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The meaning of advice and consent is at the center of continued debate.
56
  
Epstein and Segal note ―two issues in serious contention‖ with regard to 
interpreting the Framers‘ intent for the extent of the Senate‘s power in the 
advice and consent provision.
57
  The first issue is the balance of power 
between the President and the Senate.
58
 Tension remains between the views 
that: (1) the President is the major source of appointment power where the 
Senate is a ―minor check‖ on this power59 and (2) the Senate has the ―right‖ 
and ―responsibility‖ to ―reject a president‘s nominees.‖60  The second issue in 
the ―debate over the framers‘ intent‖ is the ―role of politics, partisanship, and 
ideology in judicial appointments.‖61 
The judicial selection process is such that the Senate can and does play a 
significant role in checking the President; politics, partisanship, and ideology 
are integral to the appointments process.
62
 
C.  The Process and Politics of Judicial Selection 
Formal and informal traditions, rules, and constitutional provisions govern 
the process of judicial selection.
63
  Epstein and Segal provide a broad sketch 
of the overall process.
64
  The first step is the creation of a vacancy (by 
retirement, death, or the creation of a new seat).
65
  The first step can be more 
generally viewed in terms of the Article III judge notifying the President of 
his resignation, instead of in terms of ―vacancies.‖66  Second, the President‘s 
advisors ―compile an initial list of candidates‖ for the position, and may 
conduct background checks of the candidates.
67
  Third, the President 
announces the nominees and submits their names to the Senate.
68
  Fourth, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearings, debates, and votes on the 
candidates.
69
  Simultaneously, the media, the public, interest groups, and party 
elites are involved in the process, adding a layer of national attention and 
 
56. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 13, at 18. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 463). 
60. Id. at 19. 
61. Id. 
62. See id. at 20–27. 
63. Moritz, supra note 17, at 352. 
64. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 13, at 23 fig.1.6. 
65. Id.; see Madden, supra note 7, at 1146–50 (arguing that the president‘s power to nominate 
requires an actual vacancy and that conditional resignations, as future vacancies, do not trigger the 
power to nominate). 
66. See infra Part III.B. 
67. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 13, at 23 fig.1.6. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
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exposure to the process.
70
  American Bar Association (ABA) ratings have 
been used since 2001 at the Senate Judiciary Committee stage.
71
  Finally, the 
Senate votes on whether to confirm the President‘s nominee.72 
While the process of judicial selection is ―remarkably complex,‖ Professor 
Linz Audain asserts that three categories of ―major players‖ are consistently 
involved in judicial selection: (1) ―the initiators‖ (the Executive); (2) ―the 
screeners‖ (Congress, the media, the public, and the agencies who conduct 
background checks); and (3) ―the affirmers‖ (the Senate).73  The significance 
of the roles changes with the type of judgeship being filled.
74
  For example, 
the use of ―senatorial courtesy‖ and ―blue slipping‖ are more prominent in the 
confirmation of a district court judge.
75
  Senatorial courtesy allows a senator 
from the state where the vacancy arises to select candidates from his own state 
first.
76
  Blue slipping is a process by which blue slips are sent by objecting 
senators to the Judiciary Committee, which theoretically is supposed to 
withdraw a candidate from the pool of applicants.
77
 
Historically, ideology has played a role in judicial nominations, but 
President Ronald Reagan institutionalized the selection of ―the most 
ideologically compatible judicial candidates for nomination‖ by creating a 
formal screening process.
78
  President Nixon initiated the first ―systematic 
 
70. Id.; see generally Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About Independent 
and Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 58–59 (2000) (―Once a judicial nominee has been 
forced, under oath, to voice an opinion regarding the correctness of a Supreme Court precedent on 
national television, both the appearance and reality of judicial independence has been 
compromised.‖).  See also Michael Comiskey, Not Guilty: The News Media in the Supreme Court 
Confirmation Process, 15 J.L. & POL. 1 (1999) (discussing the media‘s role in judicial 
confirmations). 
71. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 13, at 22–23.  Until 2001, the ABA ratings were a part of the 
background check stage of the process.  Id. at 22. 
72. Id. at 23 fig.1.6. 
73. Linz Audain, The Economics of Law-Related Labor V: Judicial Careers, Judicial Selection, 
and an Agency Cost Model of the Judicial Function, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 115, 124–25 (1992) (citing 
HOWARD BALL, COURTS AND POLITICS: THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 193–206 (2d ed. 1987) 
(discussing the classes and roles of participants in the federal judicial selection process). 
74. Id. at 125. 
75. Id. at 125–26. 
76. Id. at 125.  The constitutionality of senatorial courtesy is questionable, as it may violate 
separation of powers by the senators encroaching on the President‘s nomination power under Article 
II, Section 2.  See Sandra E. Strippoli, Note, Senatorial Courtesy: Not in the Public Interest, 
Justiciable and Unconstitutional, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 957 (1984). 
77. Audain, supra note 73, at 126.   
78. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the Federal 
Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 878–80 (2005).  During George H.W. Bush‘s presidency, the overt 
politicization of the nomination process was illustrated by various judicial candidates sending their 
―conservative credentials to Bush Administration officials.‖  Id. at 888.  Goldman provides an 
example of a candidate for a Second Circuit judgeship who detailed his conservative record and 
ideology in a letter to Bush Administration officials.  Id. 
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emphasis on policy considerations‖ in the judicial selection process.79  
Subsequently, President Reagan centrally institutionalized the ideas contained 
in a memorandum to President Nixon from a young White House aide, 
Thomas Charles Huston.
80
  Huston suggested: 
 
Perhaps the least considered aspect of Presidential power is 
the authority to make appointments to the federal bench—not 
merely to the Supreme Court, but to the Circuit and District 
benches as well. Through his judicial appointments, a 
President has the opportunity to influence the course of 
national affairs for a quarter of a century after he leaves 
office.
81
 
 
Huston additionally concluded that if a President ―establishes his criteria 
and establishes his machinery for ensuring that the criteria are met, the 
appointments that he makes will be his, in fact, as in theory.‖82  Subsequently, 
President Nixon, in a handwritten notation, wrote, ―RN agrees—Have this 
analysis in mind in making judicial nominations.‖83 
Now, both the Department of Justice‘s Office of Legal Policy and the 
White House Counsel have formal processes through which applicants are 
screened.
84
  The President can actually ―track potential judicial nominees for 
years,‖ and ensure that the ―Administration can effectively fill the lower 
courts with judges committed to its basic views.‖85  With the 
institutionalization of the process comes the potential cost to applicants and 
nominees.  These costs include: the difficulty of maintaining a client base 
because of clients‘ concerns that, if all goes as planned, a confirmed nominee 
would no longer be able to represent them; job loss from being nominated, but 
never getting confirmed; the significant amount of paperwork required for the 
separate White House, Senate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and ABA 
 
79. Elliot E. Slotnick, Appellate Judicial Selection During the Bush Administration: Business 
as Usual or a Nuclear Winter?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 228 (2006). 
80. Id. at 228–29. 
81. Id. at 228 (citing SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT 
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 205–06 (1997) (quoting Memorandum from 
Thomas Charles Huston to the President 1 (Mar. 25, 1969))). 
82. Id. (citing GOLDMAN, supra note 81, at 206 (quoting Memorandum from Thomas Charles 
Huston to the President 7 (Mar. 25, 1969) (emphasis in original))). 
83. Id. (citing GOLDMAN, supra note 81, at 206 (quoting Memorandum from John Ehrlichman 
to the Staff Secretary (Mar. 27, 1969) (emphasis in original))). 
84. Goldman, supra note 78, at 880. 
85. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation 
Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1508 (1992).  ―[M]any Presidents, including most of those who 
appointed the last eleven Justices, more or less overtly considered a candidate‘s likely voting patterns 
in choosing a nominee.‖  Id. at 1513. 
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background checks; and ―intrusive financial disclosure requirements.‖86 
Once the President has selected a nominee, the Senate engages in its 
advice and consent role.
87
  Both the Senate and the Judiciary Committee have 
formal rules guiding the confirmation process;
88
 however, the informal 
practices are ―[f]ar more important.‖89  Judge Pickering states that the process 
is primarily ―a hodgepodge of traditions and precedents that empower a small 
group of senators, or even an individual senator, to delay interminably the 
confirmation of judicial nominees.‖90  The Senate uses several veto gates to 
block a nomination, including: (1) denying approval from the Judiciary 
Committee; (2) ―blue-slipping‖;91 (3) a senator‘s requesting a ―hold‖ on 
having the confirmation come before the Senate or the Judiciary Committee; 
(4) the Majority Leader choosing to not hold a full vote in the Senate; (5) by 
filibustering or threatening to filibuster; and (6) not holding any vote before 
the end of a Congressional session.
92
  Another relevant obstruction to 
confirming nominees when considering the conditional resignations issue is 
the ―Thurmond Rule.‖93  The Thurmond Rule is a Senate tradition invoked at 
the end of a presidential term whereby nominations are simply delayed until 
 
86. Edith H. Jones, Observations on the Status and Impact of the Judicial Confirmation 
Process, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 833, 835–36 (2005). 
87. See supra Part II.B. 
88. 155 CONG. REC. S2550–51 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2009) (―Committee on the Judiciary, Rules 
of Procedure‖), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/about/committee-rules. cfm. 
89. Moritz, supra note 17, at 352. 
90. Pickering & Clanton, supra note 19, at 812. 
91. Moritz, supra note 17, at 355. 
92. Id. at 354–57.  See Arthur L. Rizer III, The Filibuster of Judicial Nominations: 
Constitutional Crisis or Politics as Usual?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 859 (2005) (discussing the 
constitutionality of the Senate‘s filibustering of judicial nominees); Pickering & Clanton, supra note 
19, at 815: 
 
For over two hundred years of American history, the filibuster was not 
used to block confirmation of judicial nominees with majority support. . . .  
[T]his historical practice changed dramatically during the 108th Congress in 
2003 and 2004, when Democrats filibustered ten of President Bush‘s nominees 
to the U.S. Courts of Appeals and threatened filibusters of six more. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  The resultant nuclear option to ban the use of the filibuster of judicial 
nominees and the emergence of the Gang of Fourteen senators, comprised of seven Democrats and 
seven Republicans who agreed not to vote against filibustering in the future unless there are 
―extraordinary circumstances,‖ illustrates the unpredictable and often unworkable procedure of 
judicial confirmations in the Senate.  Id. at 816 (quoting Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, A 
Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at A1); see also Sheldon 
Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Sara Schiavoni, Picking Judges in a Time of Turmoil: W. 
Bush’s Judiciary During the 109th Congress, 90 JUDICATURE 252, 264–65 (2007).  Commentators 
have argued that statutorily codifying the process would help to repair the ―badly broken‖ process.  
Pickering & Clanton, supra note 19, at 816.  However, Pickering and Clanton note that such statutes 
have been proposed and rejected in the past.  Id. at 817–18.  
93. Slotnick, supra note 79, at 235–36. 
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the next President takes office.
94
 
Judge Charles Pickering and Bradley Clanton note that ―[f]or much of our 
nation‘s history, ‗judges nominated by the President were confirmed based on 
their experience, qualifications, and integrity, rather than on their political 
stance and ideology.‘‖95  However, over time the process has become 
increasingly politicized, and it is generally accepted that the 1987 nomination 
and subsequent controversial confirmation battles over Judge Robert Bork‘s 
nomination to the Supreme Court of the United States marked a turning point 
in the increased politicization of the process.
96
  President Ronald Reagan 
declared that he would appoint judges based on ideology, causing the media 
and public opinion to influence some senators‘ votes; ultimately, the Senate 
rejected Bork for political reasons.
97
  The legacy of the Bork hearings lives 
on, and ―bork‖ has since become an entry in Black’s Law Dictionary: 
 
BORK (bork), vb. Slang. 1. (Of the U.S. Senate) to reject a 
nominee, esp. for the U.S. Supreme Court, on grounds of the 
nominee‘s unorthodox political and legal philosophy. • The 
term derives from the name of Robert Bork, President Ronald 
Reagan‘s unsuccessful nominee for the Supreme Court in 
1987. 2. (Of political and legal activists) to embark on a 
media campaign to pressure U.S. Senators into rejecting a 
President‘s nominee. 3. Generally, to smear a political 
opponent.
98
 
 
Subsequently, the ―fallout from the Bork rejection ‗quickly seeped down 
to the lower courts.‘‖99  Senate scrutiny of lower court nominees has become 
openly politicized.
100
  Nominees have been rejected ―on policy and judicial 
philosophical grounds.‖101  Delay tactics and veto gates used by the Senate to 
avoid confirming nominees based on ideology are not unique to President 
George W. Bush‘s administration, during which Senate Democrats ―delayed 
or killed‖ nominees by holding up, filibustering, or simply not acting on 
 
94. Id. 
95. Pickering & Clanton, supra note 19, at 809 (quoting Gerald Walpin, Take Obstructionism 
Out of the Judicial Nominations Confirmation Process, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 89, 90 (2003)). 
96. Id. at 811; Jones, supra note 86, at 838. 
97. Comiskey, supra note 70, at 9. 
98. Jones, supra note 86, at 838 n.20 (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 196 (8th ed. 2004)). 
99. Geyh, supra note 19, at 219 (quoting MACKENZIE, supra note 19, at 20). 
100. Id. 
101. Goldman, supra note 78, at 889; see also Orrin G. Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The 
Truth About the Judicial Selection Process: Each Is Entitled to His Own Opinion, But Not to His 
Own Facts, 11 GEO. MASON  L. REV. 467, 467 (2003). 
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nominees.
102
  Republicans engaged in the same delay tactics during the 
Clinton Administration.
103
  The delay tactics are ―especially severe‖ when the 
government is divided, that is, when control of the White House differs from 
that of the Senate.
104
 
Commentators have offered various reasons for the trend toward 
―ideological warfare‖ and ―confirmation wars.‖105  Judge Edith Jones asserts 
that ―[t]he problems of judicial selection . . . are not so much a cause as a 
symptom of the deeper division in views as to what constitutes the rule of 
law.‖106  Professor Sheldon Goldman argues that there are three main reasons 
for the increased politicization of the process: (1) judgeships, while once 
patronage jobs, are now ―policy positions‖; (2) ―party elites‖ have become 
polarized, in part because of the media‘s dramatization of current issues; and 
(3) there has been a rise of advocacy groups in both judicial selection and 
confirmation.
107
 
The Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on Judicial 
Nomination Statistics for the U.S. District and Circuit Courts between 1977 
 
102. Goldman, supra note 78, at 889–90; Geyh, supra note 19, at 219; Press Release, White 
House, President Bush Discusses Judicial Accomplishments and Philosophy (Oct. 6, 2008), available 
at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081006-5.html.  For 
example, Senate Democrats ―threatened either to place holds on or filibuster‖ President George W. 
Bush‘s judicial nominees ―unless they were assured that Democrats in states whose delegations were 
split would have the opportunity to blue-slip judicial nominees to whom they objected.‖  Brannon P. 
Denning, The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue Slip, 85 JUDICATURE 218, 218–19 (2002).   
103. Goldman, supra note 78, at 889–90.  But see Posting of Carl Tobias, Why the Federal 
Courts Should Give Thanks This Thanksgiving:  A Set of Positive Developments, with the Hope of 
More to Come (Nov. 26, 2008), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20081126_tobias.html 
(discussing recent positive developments in the federal judiciary).  For example, the number of days 
between the nomination and confirmation of a lower court nominee averaged 25.4 days during the 
Nixon administration and increased to an average of 73 days by 1997.  Geyh, supra note 19, at 220.  
The Senate questioned one of President Clinton‘s district court nominees ―as to how she had voted, 
as a private citizen, on all of the 160 initiatives on the California ballot in the preceding decade.‖  Id. 
at 219.  Senator Orrin Hatch and other senators engaged in extensive background checks, ―to weed 
out ‗liberal activists.‘‖  Id. (quoting David G. Savage, Rehnquist Chides GOP for Judicial Stalling, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at A1).  
104. Goldman, supra note 78, at 892–93.  This occurred during both the Clinton and current 
Bush Administrations, and as a result, nominees were obstructed by delays, filibuster, or inability to 
make it out of the Judiciary Committee.  Id.; see also Slotnick, supra note 79, at 232–37.  Senator 
Feingold once addressed the delay tactics used by Republicans during President Clinton‘s term: ―A 
nomination delayed is justice delayed.  As we know, justice delayed is justice denied.  A vacancy 
unfulfilled is justice unfulfilled.‖  Rizer, supra note 92, at 871 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Senator Feingold‘s philosophy was fleeting.  In 2003, he became a lead senator engaged in 
filibustering President George W. Bush‘s judicial nominees.  Id.  
105. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 78; BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: 
PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 9–12 (2006). 
106. Jones, supra note 86, at 846 (quoting Edith H. Jones, Foreword to Symposium: The Ethics 
of Judicial Selection, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001)). 
107. Goldman, supra note 78, at 875–76. 
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and 2003 indicates various relevant trends in judicial selection,
108
 including: 
 
The great majority of each President‘s district and circuit 
court nominations have been confirmed, except for the circuit 
court nominations of Presidents William J. Clinton and 
George W. Bush. 
The confirmation percentage for district and circuit court 
nominations combined was greater than 60% for every 
congressional session from 1977 through 1990, whereas the 
district and circuit combined confirmation rate has been less 
than 60% for nine of the last 13 congressional sessions. 
The average number of days elapsing between 
nomination date and confirmation has been higher for most 
Congresses in the post-1990 period than for prior Congresses. 
Starting with the 100th Congress (1987–1988), and in 
five of the eight Congresses since, an average of more than 
100 days has elapsed between nomination dates and 
committee votes on either district or circuit court 
nominations, or on both. 
. . . . 
The average number of days between nomination date 
and final action increased in Congresses ending in 
presidential election years. 
The vast majority of judicial nominations submitted 
during the 1977–2003 period received committee hearings 
and votes, as well as full Senate votes.
109
 
 
There are several practical concerns with the prevalence of delay tactics 
and ideology in judicial confirmations.  One commentator notes that the 
current system hinders judicial independence by either locking the nominee 
into a commitment on how he would rule on issues or by having the 
appearance of partiality.
110
  Others have asserted that ―[i]ntellectual 
[h]omogeneity on the Court‖ is dangerous because different views are an asset 
 
108. Denis Steven Rutkus & Mitchel A. Sollenberger, CRS Report for Congress, Judicial 
Nomination Statistics: U.S. District and Circuit Courts, 1977–2003, at i (Feb. 23, 2004), 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31635.pdf. 
109. Id. 
110. Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article 
III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 974 (2007); see generally Fein & Neuborne, supra note 70, at 62–63 
(―[C]ase-specific questioning of would-be or actual nominees is tantamount to political arm twisting 
to dictate the outcome of constitutional questions by the judicial branch. . . .  Questions about judicial 
philosophy, unlike case-specific litmus tests, have a legitimate place in presidential or senatorial 
inquiries.‖). 
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to the courts, instead of a threat.
111
  Additionally, independence in judicial 
selection and diversity on the bench will enable future Congresses, Presidents, 
and judges to effectively respond to judicial opinions and identify and solve 
problems.
112
 
The power, process, and politics of judicial selection provide a context 
within which to place conditional resignations from the federal bench. These 
findings lay the groundwork for discussing the tension between the competing 
interests of the Judicial, Executive, and Legislative branches and the Framers‘ 
intent for the institutional roles in judicial selection.  Conditional resignations 
are another piece of this politicized process. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF CONDITIONAL RESIGNATIONS 
Conditional resignations from the federal bench epitomize how checks 
and balances in judicial selection create tension among the three branches of 
government.  The constitutional limits of conditional resignations are unclear.  
They test the limits of the vested power of the Executive and Legislative 
branches in the appointments and confirmation processes, coming close to 
violating separation of powers principles.  Some conditional resignations 
could be seen as encouraging judges to be political actors in a system not 
designed for judges to engage in politics.  However, conditional resignations 
such as Judge Shabaz‘s signal transparency in the judiciary and illustrate the 
judiciary‘s concern for its caseload.113  Since 1960, the federal judiciary‘s 
caseload has increased substantially.
114
  The reality is that judicial vacancies 
can and have remained vacant for several years.
115
  Conditional resignations 
do not per se exceed the judiciary‘s powers; rather, they are a tool that the 
Framers intended the judiciary to use to protect its permanence and 
independence. 
A.  Life Tenure and Independence: The Framers’ Intent 
In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton explains that, 
 
111. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 85, at 1510–12. 
112. Id. 
113. See Shabaz, supra note 3. 
114. Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. 
CON. L. 377, 388 (2003) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 
65 (1985)); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on 
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 761–62 (1983). 
115. USCourts.gov, Current Judicial Vacancies, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialvac.cfm (click 
―Current Judicial Vacancies‖) (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).  Of the ninety-eight vacancies, eight 
vacancies are at least three years old and have no nominee pending.  Id.  For example, one vacancy in 
the Fourth Circuit has been vacant since July 31, 1994, although a nominee for the position was 
finally named in November 2009.  Id. 
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[I]n a government in which [the different departments of 
power] are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the 
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to 
the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least 
in a capacity to annoy or injure them. . . .  The judiciary . . . 
has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no 
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, 
and can take no active resolution whatever.  It may truly be 
said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and 
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm 
even for the efficacy of its judgments.
116
 
 
The Framers committed judicial selection to a system of checks and 
balances through the text of the Constitution.
117
  The fundamental separation 
of powers principles embodied in the Appointments Clause function as a 
guard against ―encroachments‖ and ―majoritarian impulses‖118 on ―individual 
rights and liberties‖ anticipated by the Framers.119  The President has the duty 
and power to nominate as he chooses, and he is checked by the Senate‘s 
―advice and consent.‖120  Life tenure ensures that the judiciary maintains its 
power and ability to operate without undue influence from the other 
branches.
121
  Indeed, a hallmark of the judiciary is its ―independent spirit.‖122  
In a system of checks and balances, the conditional resignation is a check and 
balance the Framers made available to the judiciary that can protect the 
judiciary‘s independence. 
James Madison explained that each branch must be afforded ―the 
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments 
of the others.  The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be 
made commensurate to the danger of attack.‖123  The judiciary‘s place within 
government illustrates that it ―is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, 
awed or influenced by its coordinate branches; and as that nothing can 
 
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 472. 
117. Madden, supra note 7, at 1144. 
118. Id. (quoting Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the 
Appointment Clause, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1058–59 (1987) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
48, at 313 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
119. Id. (citing Blumoff, supra note 118, at 1058–59)  
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
121. Diane S. Sykes, Independence v. Accountability: Finding a Balance Amidst the Changing 
Politics of State-Court Judicial Selection, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 341, 344 (2008). 
122. Brandon Smith, Note, The Least Televised Branch: A Separation of Powers Analysis of 
Legislation to Televise the Supreme Court, 97 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1421 (2009) (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
123. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 315–16. 
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contribute so much to its firmness and independence, as permanency in office, 
this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensible ingredient in 
its constitution; and in a great measure as the citadel of the public justice and 
the public security.‖124  Conditional resignations protect the judiciary‘s 
independence from the encroachment of other branches.  As life tenure grants 
federal judges the power to withdraw their resignation at any time before a 
nominee is confirmed,
125
 a conditional resignation illustrates an extension of 
this power. 
B.  A Delicate Balance: Masters of Their Tenure
126
  
in Violation of Separation of Powers? 
Protection of the judiciary‘s independence could come at the expense of 
its encroaching on the powers of other branches.  A conditional resignation 
from an Article III judge can interfere with the Executive‘s and Legislature‘s 
constitutionally vested powers for nomination and confirmation, respectively, 
by assuming complete control over the timing, form, and substance of the 
nomination and confirmation process.
127
 Additionally, conditional 
resignations can threaten judicial independence because they can create the 
appearance of actual partiality in the judiciary and can undermine the balance 
between independence and accountability. 
The Framers constructed government to withstand ―a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same department.‖128  The 
concentration of power in judicial selection could be shifted away from the 
President and Senate and toward the judiciary if the use of problematic 
conditional resignations occurs.  Conditional resignations can promote power 
within small interest groups of the judiciary and diffuse the President‘s 
appointment power. 
Supreme Court Justice Souter has cautioned against such ―diffusion.‖129  
Indeed, ―‗[t]he Appointments Clause forbids both aggrandizement and 
abdication.‘‖130  Arguably, certain conditional resignations could result in the 
 
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 473. 
125. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Madden, supra note 7, at 1153 (citing Clark v. United States, 
72 F. Supp. 594, 597 (Ct. Cl. 1947) (―We express no opinion on the power of the judge to withdraw 
his resignation before acceptance by the President or before the vacancy has been filled, but, for the 
purposes of this case, we shall assume that he has [the] power.‖)). 
126. See Madden, supra note 7, at 1155 (stating that a federal judge is the ―master of his 
tenure‖). 
127. Id. at 1164.   
128. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 315.  
129. Madden, supra note 7, at 1169 (citing Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 188 n.3 
(1994) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
130. Id. at 1169 n.126 (quoting Weiss, 510 U.S. at 189). 
2009] CONDITIONAL RESIGNATIONS 327 
abdication of executive appointment power to the judiciary.  The President 
cannot ―allow Congress or a lower level Executive Branch official to select a 
principal officer.‖131  The President could abdicate his discretionary power to 
nominate by accepting a conditional resignation.
132
  Depending on the 
conditions placed upon a resignation, a conditional resignation could take the 
form and substance of an appointment from the President and a confirmation 
by the Senate.  On the one hand, a resignation could be unequivocal and for a 
date certain.
133
  On the other hand, a resignation could place equivocal 
conditions on a date certain, appointment of a successor, or appointment of a 
particular successor on a resignation.
134
 
This is problematic because a conditional resignation could compromise 
the power of current or future presidents and senators.  Although the current 
President and Senate may confirm a successor for the judge who submits a 
conditional resignation, certain conditions placed thereupon could encroach 
upon the sole power of the President to nominate whomever, whenever, and 
however he or she chooses and for the Senate to confirm whomever, 
whenever, and however it chooses.  Any prospective interference could 
violate separation of powers principles because a conditional resignation 
could take away the creation of a vacancy for the succeeding President and 
Senate, if the condition is not fulfilled before the expiration of the current 
President‘s term.  A conditional resignation could also roll over to the future 
President, provided the conditions are not specific to the current President.  In 
that case, the judge submitting the conditional resignation may encroach upon 
the future President and Senate‘s power in a similar fashion.  A federal judge 
who submits a conditional resignation can assume a significant part of the 
nomination and confirmation power by dictating terms and conditions of his 
resignation. 
Additionally, certain terms and conditions of conditional resignations 
could undermine the judiciary‘s integrity by having the appearance of or 
showing actual partiality.
135
  The distinction between whether the resignation 
 
131. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 188. 
132. See Madden, supra note 7, at 1168. 
133. Id. at 1150. 
134. See id. at 1152.  The conceivable conditions placed on a resignation are infinite. 
135. Id. at 1168–69; see generally Fein & Neuborne, supra note 70, at 63: 
 
Judicial independence in the United States strengthens ordered liberty, 
domestic tranquility, the rule of law, and democratic ideals.  At least in our 
political culture, it has proved superior to any alternative form of discharging 
the judicial function that has ever been tried or conceived.  It would be folly to 
squander this priceless constitutional gift to placate the clamors of benighted 
political partisans. 
Id. 
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appears to be political or is actually political is of little value; the appearance 
of partiality can damage the integrity of the system just as well.
136
  Justice 
Ginsburg has said that the U.S. federal judiciary ―has been a model for the 
world‖ for the principal that ―[e]ssential to the rule of law in any land is an 
independent judiciary, judges not under the thumb of other branches of 
Government, and therefore equipped to administer the law impartially.‖137  
While the judiciary‘s independence is essential, conditional resignations could 
threaten its impartiality. 
Nonetheless, conditional resignations are an extension of a judge‘s life 
tenure and service during good behavior.  An increase in their use could signal 
a response and adaptation to senatorial delay tactics and the increased 
politicization of the process.  Justice Ginsburg has noted that while ―casual 
use of impeachment against federal judges is a remote prospect . . . hazing of 
federal judicial nominees [has been] unrelenting.‖138  This politicization of the 
process causes delay, ―threatens to erode the quality of justice,‖ and will 
―inevitably sap the energy and depress the spirits of the judges left to handle 
heavy dockets.‖139  As the President and Senate develop uses for tools within 
their judicial selection powers, so too may the judiciary adapt to this process 
with an increasing use of conditional resignations. 
IV.  THE PROCESS, FORM, AND TIMING OF JUDICIAL DEPARTURES 
If the judiciary tips the delicate balance by submitting problematic 
conditional resignations, then attempts to regulate judicial departures may 
naturally follow.  Regulation could come in one of two forms.  First, claims 
could be brought under current judicial ethics procedures or in federal court to 
challenge the validity of conditional resignations.  However, current ethics 
proceedings and federal court causes of action prohibit the removal of federal 
judges serving during good behavior.  As a result, Congress may attempt to 
define good behavior to prohibit or place limits on conditional resignations, or 
enact a formalized resignation process as an extension of the retirement 
statutes.  Both forms of regulation would face staunch opposition and would 
 
136. Maintaining independence in the judiciary is analogous to maintaining the integrity of 
candidates in the campaign finance context.  For example, in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976), the Supreme Court found 
that the appearance of or actual corruption of legislators stemming from campaign finance 
undermines public confidence in the legislature.  Similar to campaign finance, the judiciary should 
avoid the appearance of or actual partiality. 
137. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal Judiciary, 
85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006). 
138. Id. at 10. 
139. Id.  
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not likely succeed.
140
  However, as conditional resignations organically 
develop within the judicial selection process, a framework of regulation could 
be a natural response if the judiciary increases the tension with problematic 
conditional resignations. 
A.  Challenging the Validity of Conditional Resignations: Judicial Ethics 
The validity of conditional resignations can be challenged by bringing 
claims under current judicial ethics procedures or in federal court.  The 
current state of the law indicates that a judge can only be disciplined by fellow 
judges, but not removed.
141
  Both the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 
1980 and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges are instructive on 
whether conditional resignations comport with the judiciary‘s constitutionally 
vested powers. 
First, claims can be brought under a citizen suit provision established in 
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (the Act) that allows ―[a]ny 
person alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective 
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts  
. . . [to] file with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written 
complaint containing a brief statement of the facts constituting such 
conduct.‖142  Under the Act, the judicial council for each circuit may 
discipline violations by temporarily suspending the judge‘s ability to hear 
cases; publicly or privately censuring or reprimanding the judge; certifying 
the judge for disability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372; or ―requesting that the 
judge voluntarily retire.‖143  The Act explicitly prohibits the judicial council 
from ―order[ing] removal from office any judge appointed to hold office 
 
140. ―Enforcement of standards of judicial conduct in the federal courts has drawn substantial 
criticism.‖ Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Original Sin and Judicial Independence: 
Providing Accountability for Justices, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1139 (2009).       
141. Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 
72, 132 & n.223 (2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(3)(A) (2006) (―Under no circumstances may the 
judicial council order removal from office of any [Article III] judge appointed to hold office during 
good behavior.‖)).  A complaint can be filed against him for violating the Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act of 1980 (the Act), but again, the judge cannot be removed for any violation.  See id.; 
28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364; USCourts.gov, Judicial Misconduct and Disability,  
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/judicialmisconduct/index.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2009) 
[hereinafter Judicial Misconduct and Disability].  Complaints brought against judges for misconduct 
must be filed pursuant to each U.S. Circuit Court‘s procedures and requirements; however, most 
complaints are dismissed for failure to adhere to the law.  Judicial Misconduct and Disability, supra. 
142. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). 
143. Id. § 354(a)(2)(A)–(B).  Each circuit has a judicial council that ensures the ―effective and 
expeditious administration of justice within its circuit.‖  28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1).  In addition to its 
administrative function, a judicial council reviews judicial misconduct and disability matters.  Id.  
§ 332(g).  A council is comprised of the circuit‘s chief judge, who serves as the chair of the council, 
―and an equal number of other circuit and district judges.‖  Id. § 332(a)(1). 
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during good behavior‖ under any circumstances.144 
Second, all Article III judges are subject to the Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges (the Code of Conduct) that has been adopted by the 
Judicial Conference and is often considered in claims brought under the 
Act.
145
  The Code of Conduct adopted by the Judicial Conference sets forth 
guidelines to which ―United States circuit judges, district judges, Court of 
International Trade judges, Court of Federal Claims judges, bankruptcy 
judges, and magistrate judges‖ must adhere.146  Marking the ―first substantial 
Code revision since 1992,‖ the Judicial Conference adopted a revised Code of 
Conduct on March 17, 2009.
147
  On July 1, 2009, the revised Code of Conduct 
for United States Judges took effect.
148
  Similar to discipline under the Act, 
and because many determinations under the Act involve a consideration of 
whether a judge violated the Code, judges found in violation of the Code 
receive discipline short of removal, including ―censure, reprimand, or other 
sanction.‖149 
Conditional resignations can violate three Canons in the Code, depending 
on the type of condition, including Canons 1, 2, and 5.
150
  Canon 1 of the 
 
144. Id. § 354(a)(3)(A). 
145. In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320, 321–22 (9th Cir. Judicial Council 
1995).  The Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit has held that the Act ―is not, and never was meant 
to be, coextensive with judicial ethics as embodied in Canons‖ of the Code of Conduct for United 
States Judges.  Id. at 322 (emphasis omitted).  However, the Code of Conduct is often consulted 
when assessing whether a judge violates the Act.  See, e.g., In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 
404 F.3d 688, 688 (2d Cir. Judicial Council 2005) (finding that a circuit court judge did not violate 
the Code of Conduct for speaking at a progressive legal organization event; a circuit judge violates 
the Code of Conduct when he publicly endorses or opposes a candidate for public office; and general 
allegations of bias do not state a claim against a circuit judge under the Code of Conduct provision 
that prohibits engaging in political activity or advocacy).   
 The Judicial Conference of the United States is summoned by the Chief Justice each year, and it 
is comprised of ―the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International 
Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit.‖  28 U.S.C. § 331.  The Judicial Conference‘s 
―fundamental purpose‖ is ―to serve as the principal policy making body concerned with the 
administration of the U.S. Courts.‖  USCourts.gov, Judicial Conference of the United States, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2009). 
146. USCourts.gov, Code of Conduct for United States Judges 1, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/codeOfConduct/Code_Effective_July-01-09.pdf  [hereinafter Code 
of Conduct].   
147. Press Release, U.S. Courts, Judiciary Updates Code of Conduct; Seeks New Judgeships 
(Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2009/0309JudicialConf.cfm [hereinafter 
Judiciary Updates].   
148. Code of Conduct, supra note 146, at 1.  The revised Code of Conduct contains five 
canons, whereas the former Code of Conduct contained seven.  Judiciary Updates, supra note 147.  
Canons 4, 5, and 6 of the former code have been combined to form a revised Canon 4.  Id.  Canon 7 
of the former code has become Canon 5.  Id. 
149. See, e.g., In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d at 696.  
150. The new code, in Canon 3, also imposes an affirmative duty on federal judges to ―take 
appropriate action upon learning of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood that a judge‘s conduct 
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Code focuses on judicial independence and sets forth general guidelines on 
how the code is to be used.
151
  Canon 1 provides that: 
 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable 
to justice in our society. A judge should participate in 
establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of 
conduct, and should personally observe those standards, so 
that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be 
preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed 
and applied to further that objective.
152
 
 
Conditional resignations can undermine the judiciary‘s integrity because 
their use can exceed the scope of the judiciary‘s life tenure powers; encroach 
upon the nomination and appointment powers of the Executive and 
Legislative branches, respectively; and exude the appearance of or show 
actual partiality in judicial departures.
153
  The Second Circuit offers insight 
into determining the appropriate discipline for Canon 1 violations: 
 
The Commentary to Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges states that the question of ―[w]hether 
disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline 
to be imposed, should be determined through a reasonable 
application of the text [of the Code] and should depend on 
such factors as the seriousness of the violation, the intent of 
the judge, whether there is a pattern of improper activity, and 
the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial 
system.‖154 
 
contravened this Code . . . .‖  Code of Conduct, supra note 146, at 6.   
151. USCourts.gov, Code of Conduct for United States Judges: Current Code Compared to 
Proposed Revised Code 02/29/08, at 3, http://www.uscourts.gov/library/ 
Current_Code_with_Markup_03-03-08.pdf [hereinafter Compared Codes].  The Code provides that:  
 
Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be 
imposed, should be determined through a reasonable application of the text and 
should depend on such factors as the seriousness of the violation, the intent of 
the judge, whether there is a pattern of improper activity, and the effect of the 
improper activity on others or on the judicial system.  Many of the proscriptions 
in the Code are necessarily cast in general terms, and it is not suggested that 
disciplinary action is appropriate where reasonable judges might be uncertain as 
to whether or not the conduct is proscribed. Furthermore, the Code is not 
designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution. 
Id. 
152. Id.   
153. See sources cited supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
154. See e.g., In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d at 696.  
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Therefore, determining the appropriate discipline for a conditional 
resignation would depend on how the factors balance on a case-by-case basis.  
A violation of Canon 1 and Canon 5 (the prohibition on political activity), for 
example, could be seen as especially egregious.  As with disciplinary 
decisions under the Act, however, the decision to discipline a judge for a 
conditional resignation would rest with a judicial council‘s discretion.155 
Conditional resignations can also violate Canon 2 of the Code.  Canon 2 
provides that, ―a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all activities.‖156  The Commentary to Canon 2 defines 
―appearance of impropriety,‖ stating: ―An appearance of impropriety occurs 
when reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances 
disclosed by a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that the judge‘s honesty, 
integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is 
impaired.‖157  Canon 2B of the revised Code specifically added that any 
political influence on ―judicial conduct or judgment‖ violates Canon 2.158  
Revised Canon 2B, states in part, ―[a] judge should not allow family, social, 
political, financial, or other relationships or interests to influence judicial 
conduct or judgment.‖159  This is distinct from the former Code because 
―political, financial‖ and ―or interests‖ are added language.160  Impropriety 
and the appearance of impropriety can emanate from conditional resignations 
because they imply that the judge has made a calculated decision.  They could 
also be seen as political weapons, as when a resignation is conditioned upon a 
successor being appointed by the end of a President‘s term.  As such, a 
conditional resignation can create the appearance of or actual impropriety in 
judicial departures, and the judicial councils would have to balance the same 
 
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(1). 
156. Code of Conduct, supra note 146, at 2. 
157. Id. at 3.  The Commentary goes on to state that:  
 
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper 
conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of 
impropriety. This prohibition applies to both professional and personal conduct. 
A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny and accept 
freely and willingly restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the 
ordinary citizen. Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the 
prohibition is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges 
that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the Code. Actual 
improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules, or other 
specific provisions of this Code. 
Id. 
158. Compared Codes, supra note 151, at 3. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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factors from Canon 1 in determining the appropriate discipline.
161
 
Conditional resignations can violate Canon 5 of the Code when they are 
politically motivated.  Canon 5 of the Code provides that a ―judge should 
refrain from political activity.‖  Specifically: 
 
A.  General Prohibitions.  A judge should not: 
(1) act as a leader or hold any office in a political 
organization; 
(2) make speeches for a political organization or candidate, 
or publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for public office; 
or 
(3) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a 
contribution to a political organization or candidate, or 
attend or purchase tickets for a dinner or other event 
sponsored by a political organization or candidate. 
B.  Resignation upon Candidacy.  A judge should resign the 
judicial office if the judge becomes a candidate in a primary 
or general election for any office. 
C.  Other Political Activity.  A judge should not engage in 
any other political activity.  This provision does not prevent a 
judge from engaging in activities described in Canon 4.
162
 
 
Conditional resignations are not always political, but can sometimes 
exude the appearance of politics.  Seemingly, a judge can condition his 
resignation for a variety of reasons, many of which are not political in nature.  
However, when considering judicial departures, politics can be and have been 
motivations behind strategic departures.
163
  When a judicial departure is made 
for political reasons, the judge violates the Code.
164
 
The Second Circuit has noted that ―[t]here is little in the way of published 
case law or other guidance concerning when censure, reprimand, or other 
sanction is warranted.‖165  Certain conditional resignations have the potential 
to violate judicial ethics guidelines, and it seems as though the only way to 
circumvent the presumption against removal of federal judges short of 
impeachment is through congressional action defining good behavior, which 
 
161. See Leonard E. Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment, 36 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1181, 1256–61 (1986) (discussing factors used in determining the appropriate 
discipline to impose). 
162. Code of Conduct, supra note 146, at 15. 
163. See sources cited supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
164. See Code of Conduct, supra note 146, at 2–3. 
165. In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d 688, 696 (2d Cir. Judicial Council 2005). 
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would expand federal judicial discretion in the disciplinary context.
166
 
B.  Tipping the Balance: Congressional Response to  
Problematic Conditional Resignations 
If conditional resignations become a threat to Congress‘s appointment 
power, Congress may attempt to exercise its power to prohibit or place 
limitations on conditional resignations through the Necessary and Proper 
Clause by defining good behavior or by enacting a formalized resignation 
process as an extension of the retirement statutes.  However, Congress has 
attempted to ―police‖ the good behavior of federal judges before without 
success, and any regulation or implementation of a formalized resignation 
process is a dramatic departure from history and the Framers‘ intent.167 
In The Federalist No. 79, Alexander Hamilton writes, ―if [federal judges] 
behave properly, [they] will be secured in their places for life.‖168  Article III, 
Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution expressly adopts this tenet and provides that 
―[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
 
166. See supra note 161.  Judicial councils of each circuit court of appeals have authority to 
hear claims under the Act and discipline judges for violating the Act.  28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364 (2006).  
For example, the U.S. Judicial Conference‘s Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability reviewed 
and approved an order from the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit that publicly reprimanded 
District Judge Manuel L. Real for ―making inaccurate and misleading responses to the Judicial 
Council and special committee‖ and ―withdrawing [a] bankruptcy reference and staying a judgment 
in [a] matter based on personal knowledge and information received ex parte.‖  Judgment of Comm. 
on Jud. Conduct and Disability, No. 05-89097, slip op. at 11 (U.S. Jud. Conf. Jan. 14, 2008) (mem.), 
available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/misconduct/orders/committee_memorandum.pdf. 
167. See Ginsburg, supra note 137, at 10–12.  Congress has attempted to ―police‖ the ―good 
Behavior‖ of federal judges before without success.  Id. at 10 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Congress previously proposed limitation on judges attending out-of-town education events.  
Id. at 11.  In January 2006, three senators proposed a one-day limit on judges‘ trips to attend ―legal 
education seminars underwritten by private organizations, including, along with commercial 
enterprises, law schools, and bar associations.‖  Id.  (citing Federal Judiciary Reform Ethics Act,  
S. 2202, 109th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2006)). Justice Ginsburg also notes that there are several ―jurisdiction-
curtailing measures‖ that Congress has attempted enact, and not one of them has succeeded.  Id.  The 
Streamlined Procedures Act would have narrowed the scope of federal habeas review.  Id.  (citing  
S. 1088, H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005)).  A bill was introduced that would have precluded 
federal courts of jurisdiction over cases involving ―a governmental unit‘s or officer‘s 
‗acknowledgement of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government.‖  Id. (quoting 
Constitution Restoration Act, S. 520, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005)).  The Safeguarding our 
Religious Liberties Act would have precluded federal court jurisdiction for controversies involving 
the ―Ten Commandments, the Pledge of Allegiance, or the National Motto.‖  Id.  (citing H.R. 4576, 
109th Cong. § 2 (2005)). The We the People Act would have removed free exercise, establishment 
clause, privacy, and equal protection claims from federal courts‘ jurisdiction.  Id.  (citing H.R. 4379, 
109th Cong. § 3 (2005)).  Finally, the Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act 
―would [have] allow[ed] Supreme Court judgments declaring a federal law unconstitutional to be 
overturned by a two-thirds vote of the House and Senate.‖  Id. at 12. (citing H.R. 3073, 109th Cong. 
§ 2 (2005)).  
168. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 481. 
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during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in 
Office.‖169  The good behavior clause is not easily defined.170  Most argue that 
the Framers intended impeachment to be the only formal means to remove a 
federal judge, and that subsequent history and interpretations of the 
Constitution support this assertion.
171
  Impeachment of a federal judge can 
occur through the constitutional standard of ―‗Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.‘‖172  Indeed, Hamilton writes that federal judges 
 
are liable to be impeached for mal-conduct by the house of 
representatives, and tried by the senate, and if convicted, may 
be dismissed from office and disqualified from holding any 
other.  This is the only provision on the point, which is 
consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial 
character, and is the only one which we find in our own 
constitution in respect to our own judges.
173
 
 
However, it has been argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause is the 
constitutional gateway through which Congress could statutorily define what 
constitutes good behavior.
174
  Congress has the authority to ―[t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.‖175  
Congress may regulate the offices it creates, and here, the offices are Article 
III judgeships.  Congress cannot violate the express salary or term provisions 
of Article III,
176
 yet Congress may attempt to justify regulating judicial 
resignations by defining good behavior
177
 or, alternatively, attempt to institute 
a formalized resignation process as an extension of the retirement statutes.
178
 
The center of this debate rests in the competing values of judicial 
 
169. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
170. Prakash & Smith, supra note 141, at 134–35. 
171. Id. at 132; see Ginsburg, supra note 137, at 11–12.  
172. Jackson, supra note 110, at 987 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4).  Defining the standard 
for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors is a completely separate issue that is not 
particularly relevant to conditional resignations because a conditional resignation would clearly not 
satisfy this standard.  See id. at 988–90 (discussing what satisfies treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors for purposes of impeachment). 
173. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 481–82. 
174. See Prakash & Smith, supra note 141, at 78. 
175. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. 
176. Prakash & Smith, supra note 141, at 128. 
177. Id. at 78. 
178. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the judicial retirement statutes. 
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independence and accountability.
179
  The Framers sought to ensure that judges 
were independent through the life tenure provision and qualified this 
permanence with ―during good Behaviour.‖180  This would keep judges from 
becoming so independent that they were no longer accountable.
181
  If one 
group within government can amass enough power within the organic 
framework of judicial selection, it may be a call to action for regulation.  
There could be a response from the Legislative and Executive branches in 
formalizing the resignation process, if they feel a deprivation of power in the 
decision making.  Challenges to the validity of conditional resignations may 
be brought under the judicial ethics guidelines, and Congress may assert its 
power and establish that ―tenure [is] terminable upon a judicial finding of 
misbehavior‖182 or create a formalized resignation process, including a 
prohibition or limitation on conditional resignations.  However, there could be 
no institutional response to conditional resignations or abuse of conditional 
resignations; regulation would be a significant departure from history and 
unlikely to succeed.  The theoretical threat of regulation may be enough to 
provide sufficient tension to keep judges from exercising excessive power. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Conditional resignations are not a significant problem at this point in time.  
In theory, however, the constitutionality of certain conditional resignations is 
strikingly suspect.  Conditional resignations test the limits of the separation of 
powers and judicial ethics.  On the other hand, the Constitution does not 
explicitly detail a formalized process of resignation; rather, the judicial 
selection process has checks and balances that have developed and evolved 
over time.  As an extension of these changes, the conditional resignation can 
be seen as judges taking more control over their destiny.  Conditional 
 
179. Prakash & Smith, supra note 141, at 87. 
180. Id. at 88.  Prakash and Smith offer this summary: 
 
[W]hen the Constitution was written and ratified, the lay of the land was as 
follows.  Good-behavior tenure was understood as tenure terminable upon a 
judicial finding of misbehavior in the ordinary courts.  While in England and in 
the colonies impeachment clearly was not regarded as a means of judging 
whether officers with good-behavior tenure had forfeited their offices, in 
revolutionary America impeachment was occasionally thought an appropriate 
method of judging misbehavior.  Even so, the state constitutions reveal that 
impeachment was hardly regarded as the sole means of judging misbehavior.  
. . .  Indeed, we know of no constitution, draft or otherwise, that expressly made 
impeachment the exclusive means of removing all officials with good-behavior 
tenure. 
Id. at 117. 
181. Id. at 88. 
182. Id. 
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resignations from the federal bench offer transparency in the judiciary and 
protect federal judges‘ permanent tenure by providing another check and 
balance in the patchwork of traditions, rules, and constitutional requirements 
in judicial selection. 
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